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I.  MENTAL STATES, CAUSATION, AND LIABILITY 
The first problem that we shall examine is raised by the cases in which 
by our tortious wrong act someone is either (1) made no worse off than 
he would have been because the injury is one he would have suffered 
anyway by another means or (2) made better off because, though the act 
produces an injury, it benefits him by interfering with an upcoming 
greater injury.  Should we assign liability based on the fact that an injury 
was caused relative to how the person was in his prior uninjured state 
(namely, the causal approach)?  Or, should we take account of the fact 
that the person either was made no worse off or received a benefit 
relative to how he would have been in the future had there been no 
tortious act (namely, the counterfactual approach)? 
 
 *  © F.M. Kamm 2003.  All Rights Reserved.  Lucius N. Littauer Professor of Philosophy and Public Policy, Kennedy School of Government; Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, Harvard University; B.A. Barnard College, Columbia University; Ph.D. Massachusetts Institute of Technology.  
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Leo Katz offers one way to answer this question, though he does not 
commit himself to it, which is as follows:1 (a) Determine whether, if you 
knew that (1) or (2) above would hold, either your act would be 
permissible with no liability for damages, or no great effort would have 
to be made to avoid the act;2 (b) if the answers to these questions are yes, 
then even if you do not know that (1) or (2) holds when you act, you are 
not liable for damages.  This is a defense of the counterfactual approach.  
It proceeds by showing that the counterfactual approach would be used 
to evaluate someone’s act if he acted knowing (1) and (2) and then 
claiming that knowledge is not a necessary condition for use of the 
counterfactual approach.  In other words, if you do an act whose objective 
welfare consequences—a bad combined with a greater good—could 
either provide a justification for the act over any alternative acts in the 
case of (2), or present no reason against doing the act over any 
alternative acts in the case of (1), then even if you did not act because of 
the objective welfare consequences, you are not liable for any injury you 
cause.  Having done the act without justification, you are liable at most 
for an act that might have been, but fails to be, bad overall. 
I would say that what underlies this view is an objective versus state 
of mind theory of liability.  It can be part of an objective versus state of 
mind theory of permissible acts in general.  The latter says that 
properties of acts and their consequences make an act permissible or not, 
regardless of whether people know of these properties or act because of 
them.3  Your act can be justified even if you do not act for the sake of 
what justifies it, and liability is (mostly) a function of the former, not the 
latter. 
Katz does not put the view he describes in terms of the importance 
of objectively justifying or defending properties as opposed to states of 
mind.  He thinks the deeper point underlying the view he describes is 
that if an appropriate means (form of conduct) could have led to an 
outcome, one can use inappropriate means to bring about the same 
outcome without being held liable for the bad part of the outcome, but 
 
 1. See Leo Katz, What to Compensate? Some Surprisingly Unappreciated 
Reasons Why the Problem Is So Hard, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1345, 1347–53 (2003).  2. Katz considers what would be true if you “knew” of the consequences of your act.  Id. at 1348–50.  This is weaker than considering what would be true if you also (1) intended to bring about the consequences, or (2) acted merely because (on condition) that the consequences would occur but not intending their occurrence.  Furthermore, your knowing that a certain outcome will occur is weaker than your knowing that the consequences could provide you with a defense for an act.  This is because you may not know that the outcome provides a defense and yet act anyway.  3. Judith Thomson has defended such a view.  See JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON, THE REALM OF RIGHTS 123–48 (1990). 
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only perhaps for the use of inappropriate means.4  Let us call this the 
“interchangeable means thesis.” 
I shall begin my critical remarks by commenting on this last point.  
The interchangeable means thesis is mistakenly broader than an objective 
theory of justification or defense such as I have suggested above.  As 
Katz recognizes, it implies that simply because one might have brought 
about an outcome in an appropriate way, one is not liable for the bad 
part of the outcome when the outcome is brought about inappropriately.5  
This is different from the claim that because one will bring about the 
same outcome if one acts in a permissible way, one has no great liability 
if one brings the outcome about by means ordinarily inappropriate in 
order, for example, to avoid a big cost to oneself.  For example, if I drive 
down route A, Joe on route B will be left to drown in a raging sea, and I 
will crash into a tree and be severely injured.  If I drive down route B, 
my car will push Joe into the water where he drowns, but I will not be 
injured.  Joe drowns either way, but I can avoid killing him by suffering 
the injury on route A.  I suggest that I need not go down route A.  The 
latter claim depends on the fact that the alternative permissible act I 
would perform if I do not go down route B also has Joe’s death as an 
outcome.  By contrast, the interchangeable means thesis does not require 
that in these very circumstances the permissible act would otherwise be 
done and would result in the same outcome for a victim.  It only makes 
reference to a permissible act or omission that might have been done leading 
to the same outcome.  Hence, one cannot defend the interchangeable 
means thesis, as Katz tries to do, by presenting a case in which the 
outcome for a victim will be the same no matter what one does. 
However, Katz may hold the additional thesis that even if there is not 
a permissible means that I would have undertaken, and that leads to the 
same outcome in these very circumstances, there always could have 
been such a means had one, in the past, been willing to expend sufficient 
resources to bring such a means about.6  I doubt that this thesis is true.  
But even if it were true, it would not make morally equivalent (a) a 
situation in which there is a permissible means whose costs we seek to 
avoid and (b) a situation in which, but for our having avoided certain 
costs, there would have been a permissible means.  This is because, I 
 
 4. See Katz, supra note 1, at 1349–51. 
 5. Id. at 1350–51.  6. I gather that he does hold this additional thesis, based on a conversation I had with him on April 25, 2003. 
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believe, there is a moral difference between (i) refusing to pay costs to use 
an available permissible means rather than an ordinarily impermissible 
one when the outcome is the same, and (ii) refusing to pay costs to make 
it the case that there is a permissible means to an outcome.  If there is 
actually no permissible means, one cannot behave as though it existed 
just because it might have existed.  I conclude that it is the objective 
theory of justification, not the interchangeable means thesis, that 
underlies a defense of the counterfactual baseline test for compensation. 
Given this as background, let me now raise some concerns about using 
the counterfactual baseline to determine liability and permissibility.  
First, suppose John knows that he will soon die of a disease.  Does this 
imply that if the only way to stop Sam from negligently running over 
and killing John is for John to kill Sam, John may not do so, though a 
person not dying of a disease may do so?  After all, on the counterfactual 
view, the value of what John defends is minimal, as he would otherwise 
live only a short time anyway.  This also suggests that Sam need not 
impose a big cost on himself—correcting his negligent conduct—to 
avoid running over John.  And if Sam need not impose the cost on 
himself, why should John be permitted to impose a big cost on Sam?  
Katz’s thesis about the irrelevance of knowledge also implies that even 
if John did not know that he would soon die, his killing Sam is also 
without defense, objectively speaking, if John will in fact soon die. 
Second, suppose that if A does not run into C, breaking his leg and 
thereby preventing him from dying in a plane crash, B would do the 
same thing.  In this scenario, A only makes C no worse off than he 
would have been, not better off.  Suppose A rather than B does actually 
break C’s leg and prevents his death in a plane crash, and he does so 
because he intends to save C.  Suppose further that C would like to 
express his gratitude.  Should he be stopped by the thought that A did not 
provide him with any benefit relative to the position he would have been 
in if A had not acted?  Or, should he rather be interested in the actual 
causal chain in which A, not B, saved him from the crash.  The latter, I 
think.  So even when we use the counterfactual baseline of the plane 
crash to evaluate A’s conduct, we also recognize the importance of the 
actual causal, noncounterfactual element.  To clarify the relevance of 
this for our original problem, let X stand for what A does that B would 
otherwise have done.  If X is good (saved C from the crash), the fact that 
A actually did it matters even if B would have done it too.  Then, if X is 
bad, why doesn’t A’s actually breaking C’s leg also matter even if a 
plane crash would have done it had A not produced the same result? 
Third, suppose the plane crash would result from negligence and the 
airline company would be liable for damages.  If A crashes into C and 
breaks his leg in order to save him from the crash, there is a way in 
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which the negligent airplane crash still caused the harm to C, for A’s 
awareness of the upcoming crash prompted the effort to help.  And, 
while C is better off than if he had crashed in the plane, he might have 
been perfectly alright (a) if the upcoming crash had not given A the 
reason to act, and (b) if the upcoming crash did not present the 
alternative of death.  Arguably, the negligent company should be liable 
for the damage to C caused by A.  By contrast, now suppose that B 
crashes into C due to negligence, not to save him.  Then, there is no 
causal relation between his act and the upcoming negligent air crash, no 
way in which knowledge of that upcoming crash caused or was causally 
connected to the car crash that broke C’s leg.  The company can say that 
its negligence was in no way causally involved in the harm to C, and it is 
saved from liability for his broken leg.  The state of mind of A or B is 
important because it determines whether the actual cause of the injury is 
causally connected to what would, counterfactually, have caused the 
same or worse injury.  Suppose we would consider the negligent airline 
liable for harm that intentional rescuers do even before the airline’s 
negligence occurred.  My claim is that this helps us understand why we 
should sometimes, as in A’s case, use a counterfactual baseline to 
determine the liability of the person who actually causes the injury and 
sometimes, as in B’s case, not use a counterfactual baseline. 
Put more precisely, in my analysis the factors pointed to in these last 
hypothetical cases can be used to support the following general claims: 
(I) The causal account, as opposed to the counterfactual account, of 
assigning liability for an actual tortious act should be used when 
whatever (for example, the plane crash) would be responsible for setting 
the counterfactual baseline (namely, at death) does not have a causal role 
in explaining the actual harm.  (II) When whatever is responsible for 
setting the counterfactual baseline also has a causal role in explaining 
the actual harm, the counterfactual baseline should be used for 
determining the liability of the person who actually causes harm.  (This 
is true independent of whether there is liability in any party (for 
example, the airline) for the event (namely, the plane crash) that sets the 
baseline.)  Let us call these two claims the “cause dependence principle.” 
I have presented this principle in an attempt to explain why the use of 
the counterfactual baseline might be correct when speaking of those who 
crash in order to save, but not of those who tortiously crash.  This is so 
even though factors that could be used to justify a saving are as much 
objectively present in one case as in another.  But I am aware that this 
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principle would have to be further modified to be anything more than a 
necessary condition for the use of the counterfactual baseline, for 
suppose a driver’s knowledge of the impending airplane crash makes 
him very jittery and causes him to negligently crash his car into C, 
thereby killing him.  This satisfies condition (II) of the principle, but in 
this case do we want to say that the company is liable for damages or 
that this driver’s liability should be determined by the counterfactual 
baseline (namely, differently from any other negligent driver)?  I think 
not.  It seems that it is only if an appropriate response to what would be 
responsible (namely, the plane crash) for the counterfactual baseline is 
caused by it that the counterfactual baseline should be used to determine 
whether compensation is owed by the person who actually causes harm. 
The appropriate response by the person who actually causes harm, 
perhaps involving a particular mental state, is important because it helps 
keep the actual cause of the harm causally connected to what would have 
been the cause of the counterfactual harm.  This does not mean that the 
goodness of the mental state (for example, the intent to rescue) is 
intrinsically important to determine liability for injury; rather, the mental 
state may be only instrumentally important, for it keeps the counterfactual 
baseline-setting cause of harm involved in causing the actual harm.  
Here is a possible example where there is no good intention to rescue the 
person who is injured, and yet the counterfactual baseline is appropriate: 
I save two people who will die in a plane crash merely in order to be 
sure that they can repay their debts to me.  In doing all I must do to save 
them, I unavoidably but unintentionally crash into a third person who 
would also have died in the crash, injuring his leg.  His injury was 
caused by an appropriate response to the upcoming crash—saving the 
two even for an ignoble end.  The negligent airline should, I believe, be 
held liable for the damage to the third person, and the counterfactual 
baseline should be used to determine my liability to him.7 
 
 7. I argue that an agent cannot always be free of all moral responsibility for an injury that he causes A in order to diminish the badness for A and others of someone else’s act.  F.M. Kamm, Responsibility and Collaboration, 28 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 169, 179–81 (1999).  Only sometimes, when an agent acts at the directive of the person who would otherwise do the greater evil, does all moral responsibility for the injury shift away from the agent.  Id.  However, in this article I did not argue that when the agent who tries to diminish harm retains moral responsibility for the injury, he is also liable to compensate at great cost to himself for the damage he causes.  In addition, the cases discussed in Responsibility and Collaboration differ from the ones discussed in this Part.  Those cases involved an agent, on his own or at a villain’s request, killing A in order to stop A through F from being killed by a villain.  A’s situation is improved only in that ex ante, his probability of being killed is reduced because only one of A through F, rather than each of them, will be killed.  This is very different from A also benefiting ex post by suffering less of an injury.  It is also different, I believe, from a case in which an agent kills A, who will be killed anyway, rather than make a big sacrifice to avoid killing him.  
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II.  LEGAL UTILITY AND INTERPERSONAL PREFERENCES 
A second problem can be understood to follow on the first discussed 
in Part I, with a modification: Would everything said about the first 
problem remain the same if mere utility, understood as preference 
satisfaction or happiness, were substituted for a good outcome understood 
in nonsubjective terms (for example, having one’s life saved)?  For 
example, can making someone happier overall play the same role as 
saving his life when weighed against causing him an injury?  Consider a 
case where we crash into someone, causing his leg to be lost, but leave 
him happier overall than he would have been had he caught his plane for 
the trip that would have made his life completely miserable but would 
not have damaged him in any physical way.  Leo Katz argues that, in 
general, the law tends to ignore utility, but common sense takes it into 
account, and we have to choose one option or the other.  He calls this the 
“raw utility problem.”8 
I have several questions about his conclusion and the particulars of his 
argument.  But first, notice that one reason the law might ignore utility is 
that it refuses to believe the utility could not have been brought about in 
any way but by damaging the person.  For example, if someone is 
miserable having to fulfill a contract to engage in sports, ought he not 
work hard to pay off the contract rather than have to wait for his leg to 
be cut off so that he is unable to play sports?  To avoid this issue, let us 
suppose that the person will be coerced into sports and truly cannot 
achieve happiness unless he loses his leg. 
On this assumption, my first question is whether common sense sides 
with raw utility.  For suppose we think that someone who is devoted to 
pursuing a career in music should even cut off his leg in order to avoid 
being coerced away from that career.  We might think this not because 
we take bare preference satisfaction or happiness to be so important, for 
if someone has a bare preference to be legless, we might not think that 
he should cut off his leg to satisfy his preference.  We think it 
appropriate to focus on the character of the object of the person’s 
preference (namely, his career versus leglessness per se). 
Even if this is so, would common sense agree that if A knew that the 
 
Harming someone who will be thereby no worse off than he would have been in order to save other nonagents seems to raise special problems, and this is the case I discussed in 
Responsibility and Collaboration.  8. Katz, supra note 1, at 1353–57. 
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only way for C to have a career that will make C happy is for C to miss 
his plane, then A (without even consulting C) would have a defense if he 
crashed into C, causing his leg to be lost?  I think not.  Some may want 
to distinguish C’s achieving happiness from C’s avoiding misery, but I 
think that even the latter goal would not justify crashing into C without 
his consent.  This is in contrast to the permissibility of crashing into him 
without permission in order to save his life. 
Katz presents a very different case to support the view that common 
sense gives a strong role to (some sort of) preference satisfaction.  It is 
one where C’s leg will be lost if it is not treated, but he prefers that the 
slight damage to his pinky be treated instead.  This is because damage to 
the pinky, but not the leg, would interfere with the career he values 
above his leg.9  This is a case in which (a) we consult with C about how 
he should be treated given his preferences concerning his own life; (b) it 
is a question of interfering with C’s body in order to help one or another 
part of it, something we should not do without his consent but may do 
with his consent, given that he is competent: That is, it is not a case of 
damaging one part of his body (his leg) to help another part (his pinky) 
where his consent may not be sufficient; and (c) possibly, a judgment is 
being made about the reasonableness of the grounds for his preference; 
that is, it can make sense to take one’s career more seriously than 
preventing serious damage to one’s body. 
In what I shall call an intrapersonal case, where a person weighs his 
preferences for career against his preference for less bodily damage, I 
think a doctor is sometimes permitted to follow the patient’s preference, 
though it may result in more bodily damage.  But Katz’s case also 
involves another person B, who will lose an arm if he is not treated 
instead of C.  (Katz never mentions whether B cares about his arm.)  
Katz argues that cycling in our judgments results if we combine respect 
for a person’s preference with a more objective weighting of damage 
independent of personal preferences.  For, he says, the care of C’s leg 
should take precedence over the care of B’s arm according to the law, 
which uses the objective weighting.  But once the doctor turns to C’s 
leg, he will be right to follow C’s preference for the care of his pinky.  
However, the law will then tell him to treat B’s arm rather than C’s 
pinky, for objectively the arm counts for more.  Next, the law will also 
tell him to return to C’s leg rather than fix B’s arm, at which point the 
cycle starts over.10 
I disagree with Katz’s analysis.  I do not think cycling will occur as a 
result of taking preferences seriously in the intrapersonal context while 
 
 9. Id. at 1355–57. 
 10. Id. at 1356. 
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simultaneously giving weight to more objective rankings in the 
interpersonal context.  Cycling stops because once C agrees to have his 
pinky rather than his leg treated, the leg gets eliminated as a possible 
choice by the doctor and the law relative to B’s arm.  Hence, there is no 
need to move from B’s arm to treating C’s leg; the cycling is stopped.  
Of course, once C realizes that not even his pinky will be treated in these 
circumstances, he may prefer treating his leg to getting nothing.  Then 
the cycle stops with the treatment of C’s leg if we take the more 
objective view in the interpersonal context, as I think we should.  Hence, 
contrary to Katz, I do not think that cycling requires giving up one of 
two plausible positions—giving weight to preferences or ignoring them.  It 
only requires restricting the scope of preferences to the intrapersonal 
context and recognizing the effects of doing that on the interpersonal 
context.11 
Finally, in connection with this point, Katz discusses what he calls the 
Cooter-Porat paradox.12  First, he describes these authors as claiming 
that a cost to someone consists of a negative (drawback) component and 
positive (benefit) component.13  Hence, a cost is less as the benefit 
increases.  Notice that this claim could be made whether the benefit is  
the satisfaction of preferences or is more objectively determined.  I find 
this claim of Cooter and Porat bizarre, for it includes within the idea of 
“cost” the idea of a benefit, which is supposed to be distinct from “cost.”  
Just because a benefit gets larger, that does not mean that the cost 
(which, on my view, is just the drawback) becomes smaller, though it 
may become more worth paying.  Katz further describes Cooter and 
Porat as taking the view that the objective benefit should be used in the 
calculation of their conception of the “cost.”14  This would imply that 
when one’s act presents a risk of injury to others and to oneself as well, a 
determination of negligence in failing to pay the cost of precautions 
should be based on the fact that the cost to oneself would have been low.  
 
 11. In a conversation I had with him on April 28, 2003, Katz suggested that special deals might be made between C and B that will result in different stopping points.  For example, because B will get nothing if C’s leg is treated, and C would prefer that his pinky be treated, B might waive his right to have his arm treated instead of B’s pinky for some money.  Then B can have his pinky treated.  I am not interested in disputing that point here, as it also leads to the conclusion that the cycling can be stopped.  12. Robert Cooter & Ariel Porat, Does Risk to Oneself Increase the Care Owed to 
Others? Law and Economics in Conflict, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 19, 19–20 (2000).  13. Katz, supra note 1, at 1356–57 n.8. 
 14. Id. 
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This is because an objective benefit to the tortfeasor—his also avoiding 
injury—would have occurred had he taken precautions.  My grounds for 
objecting to doing the calculation in this way are as follows: If someone 
in the intrapersonal context has personal grounds for refusing to value 
the objective benefit over the costs of precautions, it is wrong to do a 
calculation in the interpersonal context that depends on requiring him to 
accept this benefit, even if doing so is in the interest of someone else 
who would have benefited from his paying the cost of precautions. 
III.  THE EXPECTANCY PROBLEM 
Katz calls the third problem that we shall examine the mere “expectancy 
problem.”15  It can be connected to the problem with which we began in 
Part I in the following way: Should we compare how a person will be if 
a promise is not fulfilled with (a) the counterfactual baseline of how a 
person would have been if the promise had been fulfilled, or (b) a 
baseline of how the person would have been if the promise had not been 
made?  Notice that (b) is also a counterfactual baseline, since it does not 
merely refer to how the person was before the promise, but takes 
account of opportunities foregone due to reliance on the promise.  
Connecting this problem with the main problem in Part II would involve 
deciding whether happiness and preference satisfaction should be relied 
on to determine the person’s condition as it would have been and as it is.  
A case analogous to the one focused on in Part I would arise if someone 
would be as well or better off if his promise went unfulfilled than if it 
were fulfilled. 
Those who say we should use baseline (b) say that a person should be 
compensated for the reliance costs of a failed promise, that is, the way in 
which he is worse off than he would have been because of his reliance 
on the promise.  This will include other opportunities he passed up and 
would have taken but for the promise.  Strictly speaking, I think these 
opportunities should be ones a person would have had independently of 
the promise being made.  For if a promise by A to B results in other 
people offering B new opportunities that he passes up due to reliance on 
A, it is not true that B is worse off than he would have been if the 
promise had not been made.  On the other hand, if foregoing such new 
opportunities due to reliance on A was relevant to compensation, then (b) 
would not be correctly phrased.  Of course, someone may be better off 
than he would have been if the promise had not been made just in virtue 
of having gotten a promise, even if there is reliance and the promise is 
not kept.  For example, if people know that a famous person promised you 
 
 15. Id. at 1357–62. 
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something (even unimportant), your credit rating may go up enormously. 
Some who say we should use baseline (a) seem to equate the state the 
person would have been in if the promise had been kept with the one he 
expected to be in—hence the name “expectancy problem.”  According to 
Katz, some who support (a) further think that the promise to be given X 
gives one a right to X, and so not giving the promised X is tantamount to 
wrongfully taking away from someone an X that he already has and to 
which he has a right.16 
We have seen in Part I that many may often be attracted to a counterfactual 
baseline for compensation, considering what would actually have 
happened if not for some wrong.  But while Katz understands this, he 
thinks that even supporters of such a counterfactual baseline might 
object to setting the baseline at what should have happened, that is, at 
what was promised to happen.17  Hence, when what would have 
happened depends on the fulfillment of a promise, there are additional 
reasons to think that wrongs, such as failing to fulfill the promise, that 
interfere with what would have happened are not to be dealt with by 
using the counterfactual baseline (a) for compensation. 
Before considering the grounds that Katz raises for objecting to the 
use of (a), let me raise some questions of my own about both (a) and (b).  
First, it seems wrong to equate (a) with a view that considers someone’s 
actual expectations and call it the “expectancy view,” for suppose A 
promises B to deliver groceries, but B does not trust A and fully expects him 
to fail in his promise.  A expects nothing and it may even be reasonable 
of him to expect nothing, but because of the promise, he has a right to 
expect and a right to the delivery.  He may want to get a promise that he 
does not expect to be fulfilled because he wants it as proof of A’s lack of 
dependability or because the law might enforce it.  It is what he has a 
right to, not what he expects, that should be the basis of (a).18 
My second question bears on both (a) and (b): Why should someone 
 
 16. Id. at 1359. 
 17. Id. at 1357–60.  18. Thomas Scanlon’s theory of promising and of the wrong of not keeping promises seems to be based on the importance of not defeating expectations we have intentionally engendered.  See T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 295–327 (1998).  This theory must be mistaken, I believe, as an account of the wrong of breaking a promise because it can be wrong to break a promise even when it reasonably gives rise to no expectations.  It can be wrong because promising gives someone a right to expect fulfillment and a right to be given something, whether he expects its fulfillment or not, whether he knows he has the right or not. 
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be compensated for all resulting damages or be in the state he would 
have been in if either the promise had been kept (on (a)) or if it had 
never been made (on (b))?  Suppose I promise you a car and do not 
deliver.  At the time of the promise, you were interested in having the 
car just to drive on your own.  But you are a commercial genius and 
afterwards see a way to make a deal to sell the car for a hundred times its 
market value.  Am I really responsible when I promise the car for all the 
not-reasonable-to-expect consequences that you would actually bring 
forth if you had received the car (on (a)), especially when they had 
nothing to do with what made you value the promise in the first place?  
Am I really responsible for all the not-reasonable-to-expect 
consequences that you would have brought forth if you had not relied on 
my promise and done other things instead (on (b))?  This seems much 
too demanding a theory of promising, affecting both (a) and (b).  If it 
were true, people should be very wary about making promises they are 
not absolutely sure they can fulfill.19 
Further, I believe that similar constraints on counting all actual 
consequences should exist when a right based on actual possession, not 
based on promising, is wrongfully breached.  For example, suppose I 
steal your old car that you (a commercial genius) would have sold for a 
billion dollars.  I ought not to be liable for compensating you for the 
billion.  Hence, I do not think it is the “flimsiness” of the protected 
interest in the case of a promised possession, as Katz puts it, by contrast 
to the interest in an actual possession that is necessary to support such 
constraints.20  So let us henceforth assume that the law is only concerned 
with liability for reasonably foreseeable consequences of committing a 
wrong such as breaking a promise.  The question remains: Is (a) or (b) the 
baseline for measuring the comparative badness of the consequences? 
The way I would put Katz’s complaint against (a), based on the cases 
that he presents, is that having a right to something by way of a promise 
is not morally the same thing as having that to which one has a right.  
When someone interferes with what you have and to which you have a 
right, he will violate a negative right of yours.  But when he violates 
your right to have something be given to you by not fulfilling his 
promise to give it to you, or by interfering with the fulfillment of someone 
else’s promise to you, he interferes with the fulfillment of a positive 
 
 19. This was recognized by the famous decision in Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 151 (Ex. D. 1854).  20. Does such a constraint on considering consequences account for Katz’s case in which someone’s violation of a rule against cheating results in his getting a higher grade on his record, and this results in his depriving someone else of a valuable job?  Is being deprived of the job an unforeseeable consequence of the wrong and, for this reason, noncompensatable?  Katz thinks not.  See Katz, supra note 1, at 1360. 
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right.  A sign of the relative strength of these negative and positive rights 
is shown by how much you could permissibly do to prevent the 
wrongful interference with their fulfillment, holding constant welfare 
consequences of the interference.  The negative constraint is very strong 
by this test.  Katz thinks the positive is relatively weak, as you could not 
do much to stop the interference with the positive right.21  For example, 
if someone will take your drug that you need to save your life, it is 
permissible to kill him to prevent his act.  If A will not give you the drug 
that you need to save your life that he promised, or if B interferes with 
A’s keeping his promise, you may not kill either to get the drug. 
I am inclined to agree with this test.  However, I would add the 
following explanation of the difference it registers: A’s promise to give 
you X is unlike an agreement that, at a certain time, X will be your 
property (even if you do not have it in your possession).  Once the 
agreement is made, nothing else except the passage of time needs to occur 
for X to be yours, and the interference with X and with your having it 
after that time violates a negative right.  By contrast, a promise to be 
given X gives you a right to come to have rights over X by way of your 
having a right to some further performance by the promisor.  And, if the 
promisor fails to give you this performance: (1) your positive right to the 
performance is violated, and (2) its violation interferes with your having 
rights over X.  Hence, since you never had rights over X per se, only over 
the performance that gives both X and the rights over X, the 
counterfactual baseline of how you would have been with X seems 
inappropriate for determining liability. 
Suppose that someone who commits the wrong of breaking a promise 
is not liable to compensate for all the foreseeable consequences of the 
wrong.  Then, in cases not involving violation of promises, does committing 
a wrong make one liable for all the reasonably foreseeable bad 
consequences of the wrong?  My sense is that if I do a wrong, even a 
wrong to you, as a way of doing something else that I have a right to do, 
and that foreseeably negatively affects you, I should not necessarily be 
liable for the negative effects.  For example, to use a case based on one 
suggested by Katz,22 suppose that I illegitimately take your parking spot 
in order to rush to a store to buy the last respirator.  I do this knowing 
that you too need to park in your space in order to go buy this last 
 
 21. Id. at 1360–62.  22. Katz suggested this example in a conversation I had with him on April 28, 2003. 
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respirator.  Because of the wrong I do to you, you will die through lack 
of the respirator, while I will survive by using it.  I agree with Katz’s 
sense that I should not be liable to compensate your estate for the loss of 
your life simply because a wrong to you was committed.  This is because 
committing the wrong enabled me to make a legitimate purchase, and it 
was this legitimate purchase that had the very bad effect on you.  What if 
the purchase itself had been illegitimate—for example, I was banned 
from buying medical supplies in this country?  Perhaps I should then be 
liable for compensating for the loss of your life. 
IV.  WRONGFUL EXISTENCE AND TORT LIABILITY 
The fourth problem with which we shall deal concerns cases in which 
without a tortious action someone would not have come into existence.  
Katz chooses to focus on a case of this sort that involves a triangle: A’s 
tortious conduct to B causes C’s existence, as well as some problem that 
C has (for example, ill health).23  We should understand this as 
follows: C could not have existed without the health problem.  This 
case differs from one in which C would be created without this 
necessitating a health problem and then A, by his tortious conduct, 
would also make C sick.  Is A liable to compensate C for his problem?  
Katz notes that if we are tempted by the counterfactual approach, we 
cannot say that if A had not acted, C would have been better off.  This is 
because C would not have existed, and being better off at least seems to 
require that a person would have been in a better state than he is in.24  
Let us assume that if A had acted nontortiously, either no one would 
have existed or D would have existed in a better state than C is in.  The 
latter possibility gives rise to the “nonidentity problem,” which involves 
someone like C being worse off, not than he would have been, but than 
someone else like D would have been.25  Should the fact that someone 
else would or even could have existed in a better state give C grounds 
for holding A liable for C’s health problem?  In an impersonal morality, 
such as utilitarianism, A might be held accountable for producing a 
worse state of affairs, but that does not mean he owes C, in particular, 
anything.  To what Katz says, I would add that, strictly speaking, we 
also cannot say—unlike what was said of the person whose leg was 
damaged but whose life was saved from a plane crash—that if A had not 
acted, C would have been worse off.  This is because C would never 
have existed, and being worse off also, at least, seems to require that a 
 
 23. Katz, supra note 1, at 1362–66. 
 24. Id. at 1363–64.  We shall cast doubt on this claim below.  25. Derek Parfit discovered the nonidentity problem.  See DEREK PARFIT, REASONS 
AND PERSONS 351–79 (1984). 
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person would have been in a worse state than he is in.26 
If we are tempted by the causal approach, we can say that A caused 
C’s health problem.  But since C did not already exist without the problem 
and A also caused him to exist, can this not be thought of, according to 
Katz, as giving C half of a loaf instead of a whole rather than taking 
away half of a loaf already belonging to C?27  And then if A, in addition 
to this, gives C a large inheritance, to which any of A’s offspring are 
entitled, why is C entitled to any compensation from A for his health 
problem?  Hence, on either the causal or counterfactual approach, we 
have trouble accounting for a duty to compensate C for his problem. 
In dealing with this issue and some of the things Katz says about it, I 
think it is necessary to get clearer about some related matters.  Is being 
in existence a benefit to someone to be weighed against a problem he 
has?  It is not strictly a benefit, in part because there was no one in 
existence prior to creation whose state would be improved by existing 
and who would be worse off not existing.  This is one reason to think 
that if a health problem will exist if someone is created, then even if his 
life will overall be worth living, it might be wrong to create him.  After 
all, no one was in need of existing and so no one would be forgoing a 
benefit of life in order to avoid a health problem.  A person who is 
created is not strictly benefited if he is not better off than he otherwise 
would be.  This includes being better off than if he were not in existence 
at all and being better off than he would have been if created in a 
different condition.  On the other hand, though a perfectly glorious life is 
not strictly a benefit to the person created, because it is the person who is 
created who will have all the goods of the life, I think it is appropriate in 
many ways to think of being created to a good life like a benefit.  Certainly, 
we can benefit a person whom we save from death, even if he would not 
otherwise have been in a worse state but rather nonexistent.  Hence, it is not 
true that being benefited requires that one be in a better state than one 
would otherwise have been in.  Of course, when we save a life, but not 
when we create one, there can be someone who needs to continue to exist. 
If we are willing to stretch the notion of benefit to include creation to 
 
 26. We shall cast doubt on this claim below.  27. Katz, supra note 1, at 1364–65.  Note that if an entity (e.g., a fetus) that has a whole loaf is not yet the sort that is entitled to keep it, taking away part of the loaf may also be permissible.  This can be true even if the entity grows into a person who will live with only the half loaf, so long as this half meets some threshold.  For more information, see generally F.M. Kamm, Genes, Justice, and Obligations to Future People, 19 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 360 (2002). 
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a new good life, does this imply that the good parts of a life are to be 
weighed against an unavoidable problem in the life, and if the problem is 
outweighed, no compensation is owed?  Not always, I believe, as will be 
argued below. 
Might we also stretch the notion of harm to include creation to a life 
that is worth not living, for example, a life full of meaningless pain and 
misery?  It can still be true of this person that in being created to such a 
life, he is not worse off than he would otherwise have been since he 
would not otherwise have been in a better state (namely, he would have 
been either nonexistent or created to no better state).  But we can 
recognize that nonexistence is better than such a bad existence and 
stretch the notion of being harmed to being created to such a state.  
Derek Parfit recognizes this by only discussing the nonidentity problem 
in connection with people who have lives at least minimally worth living 
or better; they are worse off than someone else might have been, but 
they are not worse off than if they were nonexistent.28  This is one reason 
why he would not agree with Katz’s view that the nonidentity problem 
implies that future generations could never have a complaint against you 
when, had you acted differently, they would not have existed.  Those 
future generations living lives worth not living would still have a 
complaint not dependent on resolution of the nonidentity problem.  Also, 
if we save someone from death when his life is worth not living, we 
harm him even though he is not worse off than he would have been, 
assuming death involves nonexistence.  Hence, it is not true that being 
harmed requires that one be in a worse state than one would otherwise 
have been in. 
Suppose that C is living a life worth not living when the alternative is 
not having been in existence, and his existence is due to A’s tortious 
conduct to B.  Then is A not liable for harm to C?  I think he is.  Further, 
we can conclude in a two-person scenario that A’s creating C to such a 
life when he could easily have avoided it is what can constitute A’s 
tortious conduct, and hence A not only harms C, but wrongs him even in 
the absence of treating B tortiously.  In this case, it seems right to 
conclude that A owes C compensation. 
Next, notice that in previous cases we have considered, such as where 
a person is saved from a plane crash, the benefit that someone gets when 
we do something that also injures him consists not only in his not being 
worse off, but in his avoiding a very bad fate.  Seana Shiffrin has argued 
that causing a lesser harm can be acceptable as a way of preventing 
someone declining to or being in such a very bad state, but it is not 
acceptable as a way of providing someone with, or even of seeing that he 
 
 28. PARFIT, supra note 25, at 359, 362–63. 
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retains, a very positive condition when being without it does not involve 
having a very bad fate.29  After all, someone can be in danger of 
becoming worse off, and yet this involves only his losing a great good 
and falling into a merely adequate life.  Hence, she distinguishes between 
the permissibility of putting people at risk or harming them to save their 
lives and the impermissibility of doing this in order to give them a 
billion dollars by dropping gold bullion bricks on them when they 
already have adequate lives.  It is impermissible to throw the bullion 
bricks, she says, even if the people would be overall better off with a 
broken leg caused by the brick plus the billion than they were or would 
have been otherwise.  Hence, she is willing to net out harm we cause to 
another in the case where they avoid a very bad fate, but not where they 
get a very good fate.30 
Now people hit with bullion bricks are, in having broken legs, worse 
off than they were or would have been in that way, though they are 
better off overall because of the billion dollars.  Someone created with a 
disease, however, is not, with regard to the diseased state, strictly worse 
off than he was or would have been.  Still, Shiffrin thinks he is in a bad 
way (she calls it a “harmed state”), not merely lacking some further 
good added to an adequate condition. 
Putting this together with the generous view that coming into 
existence to a very good life is like a benefit, she concludes that doing 
what causes the benefit of life to C when one must also cause a problem 
for C (such as his having a disease), can itself consist in tortious 
conduct.  The problem is not merely outweighed by the good.  Hence, 
compensation could be required even when someone is “benefited” overall 
by being in existence.31  Shiffrin’s analysis implies that compensation is 
 
 29. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Wrongful Life, Procreative Responsibility, and the 
Significance of Harm, 5 LEGAL THEORY 117, 119–35 (1999).  30. Shiffrin refers to such very bad fates, regardless of how one came to be in them, as harmed states. She does not say whether she thinks that allowing someone to be in a harmed state rather than relieving his problem is wrong.  However, she suggests this by writing, “[W]e often consider failing to be benefited as morally and significantly less serious than both being harmed and not being saved from harm.”  Id. at 121.  She also does not consider whether making someone worse off by taking away a pure benefit is permissible in order to provide him with a large benefit.  For example, suppose the bullion bricks are always thrown over people’s gardens and can never do more than damage their trees and flowers.  If such property infringements and setbacks were also impermissible, this would show that harmed states are not uniquely prohibitive.  But she writes, “[T]he asymmetry remains even if one compares active harming to the active removal of a benefit . . . .”  Id. at 121 n.14. 
 31. Id. at 148. 
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owed to the child in Katz’s case where the created child has a health 
problem. This would be so, whether or not the child’s existence is due to 
tortious conduct toward someone else. 
Shiffrin extends these conclusions, for she says that even an average, 
unexceptional life has problems.  Among these problems, she thinks, are 
the burdens of moral choice, pain, and having to cope with death.  Hence, 
she concludes, even an average parent, in creating a life overall well 
worth living is involved in tortious conduct and may owe compensation 
to his or her child.  The compensation takes the form of giving the child 
assistance in life that parents typically give.32 
I disagree with Shiffrin’s analysis of ordinary creation as tortious and 
calling for compensation.  First, it seems odd to me to treat as problems 
or being in a harmed state some of the very things that give value to 
human life, such as moral consciousness.  It is possible that some of the 
things that give value and meaningfulness to human life are not best 
thought of as benefits to the person (namely, as improving his well-being).  
Hence, deciding if creating a human person is right or wrong requires 
more than weighing what are goods and evils to the person created. 
Second, I think that the example of the person who may not throw 
bullion bricks on people risking damage to them for the sake of 
enriching them is an inadequate analogy to creating people.  For a 
natural way to resolve the dilemma in the bullion case is for the donor, if 
it is possible, to reduce the size of what he is throwing, thus eliminating 
risk, even if it also reduces the additional riches he can give.  But the 
analogous course in the case of creating life would be to reduce the 
goods one creates to the point that is necessary to eliminate the 
problems.  Hence, Shiffrin’s argument would lead one to conclude that 
creating creatures incapable of moral choice, never in pain, and unaware 
of truths such as the prospect of death, like extremely happy, long-lived 
rabbits who have no other problems, would be preferable to creating 
human persons as they are now.  But I think this is the wrong conclusion.  
It would be wrong, and would have been wrong at the beginning of 
creation, to substitute such creatures for continuing humanity.  Shiffrin 
emphasizes that she has constructed the bullion case so that it is not 
possible to bestow a benefit in a nonrisky way, and still either it is wrong 
to drop the bullion or one must compensate those hit.33  My point is that 
this does not show that creating people with certain common problems is 
either wrong or requiring of compensation when it is not possible to 
avoid the problem, for, I have argued, reducing benefits to avoid 
problems is what should be done in the bullion case, if it were possible, 
 
 32. Id. at 144–45. 
 33. Id. at 135 n.33. 
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but reducing benefits to avoid certain problems is not what should be 
done in the creation case, if it were possible.  Arguably, if it would be 
wrong to eliminate problems at the cost of either reducing the benefits to 
the person or reducing values in the human condition, one should not be 
liable for compensation for certain unavoidable problems if one 
produces the benefits and values that outweigh them on balance.34  (It is 
also true, I believe, that dropping the bullion in the absence of an ability 
to compensate for a problem caused would be wrong.  But creating a 
child in the absence of the ability to compensate for ordinary problems 
of life is not wrong.)  All this suggests that parents’ duties to the children 
they create are not to be grounded in a duty to compensate, but in 
something else. This would make it harder to argue for compensation in 
Katz’s case of creating someone with a health problem.35 
My own view36 is that creators owe their creations, at reasonable cost, 
certain things that I call the “minima.”  These involve more than just 
things that make lives barely worth living.  Hence, I do not think that 
giving half a loaf, as distinct from giving a whole loaf and then taking 
half away, is permissible if the half a loaf falls below the minima.  A 
rapist who created a child without the minima, even if the life was worth 
living, would wrong the child.  What are the minima?  What if one could 
have easily given more than the minima to the same individual but 
instead gave only the minima?  What if one could have easily created a 
 
 34. I say only “arguably” because it is possible that an unconventional view of compensation might be correct.  This is the view that says that (roughly) one has a duty to see to it that there not be a problem of which one is the cause.  It contrasts with the view that says (roughly) one has a duty not to cause a problem.  The first view (unlike the second) implies that if one should not have avoided producing a problem at the expense of not producing a good (even when no compensation afterwards would be possible), one may still be liable for compensation when compensating is possible.  This is because one can make it the case that there not be a problem of which one is the cause after one causes it without eliminating the great good.  For more on these two views, see Frances Myrna Kamm, The Insanity Defense, Innocent Threats, and Limited 
Alternatives, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Winter/Spring 1987, at 61.  35. Shiffrin seems willing to equate actively bringing about bad states and allowing bad states to come about because her focus is on the state one is in (harmed or not) rather than on whether one was caused to be in it or merely left to be in it.  Combine this with her emphasis on avoiding bad states relative to achieving benefits for people already in passable states.  The result is that Shiffrin would seem to have to condemn a parent who allows a child to travel on buses, thereby increasing his risk of damage, for the sake of going to piano lessons—at least insofar as bus riding is not a means to warding off other harms.  I think this is the wrong conclusion. 
 36. See F.M. KAMM, CREATION AND ABORTION: A STUDY IN MORAL AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 132–33 (1992). 
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different person with more than the minima?  These are difficult 
questions—the last one reintroducing the nonidentity problem—and I 
shall not address them here.37 
What about Katz’s additional case in which all children of the rapist 
are entitled to a sizable inheritance, X, from him or a distant relative?  
Should their receipt of this be netted against the things in the minima 
that were not provided by the rapist?  One reason to think it should not is 
that all the rapist’s children are entitled to both X and to the minima.  
Why should one’s inheritance be reduced just so that it can make up for 
something else that should have been provided independently? 
V.  CONCLUSION 
I have argued that in various ways and for various reasons, how things 
would have been but for a tortious act is often irrelevant to our 
responsibilities to the victim(s) of the act. Whether compensation is 
owed and how much can depend on whether what would have happened 
is in some way causally responsible for what did happen, whether one 
already has a claim to what one would have gotten, and whether one 
must not do something without meeting a certain standard.38 
 
 
 37. For a more complete discussion of these issues, see id.  38. For comments on this Article, I am grateful to Leo Katz, Derek Parfit, and Seana Shiffrin. 
